Prior research has documented both positive (John and Litov, 2009) and negative (Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997) 
Introduction
Separation of ownership and control in modern corporations leads to conflicts of interest among a firm"s stakeholders, including managers, shareholders, and bondholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976) . Previous research shows that the empirical varieties observed in the cross-section of firms about capital structure can be explained by conflicts of interest (Myers 1977; Jensen 1986; Berger, Ofek and Yermack 1997) . Corporate governance mechanisms arise as a response to agency problems between shareholders and managers. These mechanisms can be either internal, such as board monitoring, or external, such as takeover threats, government regulations, and managerial labor markets. The interaction between internal and external mechanisms determines the effectiveness of a firm"s total governance structure (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . Instead of studying the impacts of internal or external corporate governance mechanisms on firm leverage separately, we acknowledge the substitution effects (Barber and Liang 2008; Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks 2007) between internal and external governance mechanisms and find that positive correlation between antitakeover provisions and firm leverage is driven by the interaction effect between antitakeover provisions and board power, which is measured by board independence. We argue boards that are more independent redirect managers to choose more debt. This is different from John and Litov (2009) "s argument that entrenched managers tend to raise more debt. ______________________________________________________________ *Dr. Yihua Zhao, Freeman School of Business, Tulane University. Email: yihuazhao@tulane.edu **Dr. Lin Zou, School of Management, Texas Woman"s University. Email: LZou@twu.edu A large literature investigates different effects of corporate governance on a firm"s capital structure. John and Litov (2009) find that firms with entrenched managers have higher leverage. They document that an entrenched manager receives better credit ratings and better financing terms because the conflict of interest between debt-holders and shareholders is less severe if the manager is entrenched. Thus debt financing becomes cheaper and the firm can issue more debt. This explanation is inconsistent to the conventional wisdom that entrenched managers tend to avoid debt (Berger, Ofek and Yermack 1997; Garvey and Hanka 1999; Kayhan 2009 ). The conventional wisdom argues that managers prefer lower debt ratio because they want to protect their human capital by reducing firm risk and to have more free cash flows in the firm. Similar to these arguments, we believe that debt imposes bankruptcy costs to firms and managers, and that managers prefer a lower debt ratio because the lower debt ratio generates more free cash flow. However, the existence of a powerful board prevents managers to keep the debt ratio lower than the optimal level. Although our results support John and Litov (2009) "s finding, this paper provides an alternative explanation. We hypothesize and find that an independent board (a powerful board) is likely to exist when managers are entrenched by antitakeover provisions and an independent board redirects managers to use more debt financing.
Using the G-index of antitakeover provisions, constructed by Gomper, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) , as a measure of managerial entrenchment, we find positive correlations between managerial entrenchment and leverage, consistent with the findings of Jiraporn and Gleason (2009) , Wald and Long (2007) , and John and Litov (2009) . However, our univariate result shows that leverage is not always increasing in G-index. The positive correlation between leverage and G-index consistently exists in high board independence groups but not in low board independence groups. This result supports our hypothesis that a powerful board redirects entrenched managers to use more debt. We include the interaction between the antitakeover provision and board power in regressions. To test the hypothesis that a powerful board redirects managers to use more debt financing, we regress leverage on antitakeover provisions, board independence, and the interaction of these two types of governance mechanisms. We find that the use of antitakeover provisions does not affect firm leverage per se; rather, it is the interaction term between antitakeover provisions and board independence that matters. Firms" leverage decisions are statistically and economically (considering the magnitude of estimated coefficient and standard deviations of dependent and independent variables) significantly related to the interaction of board independence and antitakeover provisions. Our evidence implies that in the presence of higher G-index, independent boards will redirect managers to issue more debt to take advantage of the low cost of debt.
To check the robustness of the results, we include other governance proxies, such as CEO"s stock ownership, CEO"s tenure, Delta of CEO"s compensation, and the appearance of blockholders. The statistical significance of the interaction term between board independence and the G-index remains after we control for these variables. Our results also suggest that the financing decision is related to the board power and related to its interaction with the G-index, but not related to the G-index per se. This paper contributes to the existing literature along the following dimensions. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the effect of the interaction between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on firms" leverage. Our finding extends our knowledge by showing that two types of corporate governance mechanisms have an interactive effect on firm leverage. Second and more importantly, we further explore the driving force of the positive correlation between a high G-index and debt financing. John and Litov (2009) show that the less alignment between managers and shareholders, due to antitakeover provisions, the more attractive the firms" debt to creditors. That is why entrenched managers will issue more debt. Their argument is against the conventional wisdom that the entrenched manager prefers equity to debt. However, our finding is consistent with the conventional wisdom that entrenched managers try to avoid debt but independent boards redirect entrenched managers to issue more debt to take advantage of the low cost of debt. Last but not least, our findings, which take both internal and external governance mechanisms into consideration, reconcile the seemingly conflicting literature. While John and Litov (2009) proxy managerial entrenchment by the number of antitakeover provisions, Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) consider a wider range of governance mechanisms, including antitakeover, CEO compensation, and board monitoring. This paper suggests that internal and external governance mechanisms interact with each other to influence debt financing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews literature about corporate governance and debt financing. Section Three describes the sample, analyzes the relationship between leverage and the interaction between board power and antitakeover provisions, and discusses different purposes and potential benefits of board power and antitakeover provisions. Section Four estimates the relationship between the G-index and firm leverage, and board power"s impact on this relationship. Initially, we assume that the financing decision is determined independently of the corporate governance choice. We then relax this assumption and use two stage least square regressions (2SLS) to consider the potential endogeneity problem. In this section, we also provide robustness checks. Section Five concludes the paper.
Literature Review and Hypotheses
Existing literature provides ample evidence that agency conflicts among managers, shareholders, and bondholders impacts firms" financing decisions Meckling 1976, Myers 1977; Jensen 1986; Berger, Ofek and Yermack 1997) . Agency conflicts can be mitigated by a variety of corporate governance mechanisms. However, different corporate governance mechanisms have various effects on the interests of managers, shareholders, and bondholders. For example, antitakeover provisions, a type of external governance mechanism, shift control power towards managers. Thus self-interested managers will adopt conservative investment policies, aligning their interests with the bondholders and working against the shareholders" interest (John, Litov, and Yeung 2008) . In contrast, board independence and strong shareholder control, as internal governance mechanisms, align managers" interest with shareholders" and may hurt the interest of bondholders who require higher bond yields (Cremers, Nair, and Wei 2007) .In reality, the external and internal corporate governance mechanisms appear to serve as substitutes to mitigate the agency conflicts (Gallian, Hartzell, and Starks 2007; Barber and Liang 2008) . A firm"s leverage reflects the tradeoff of a variety of corporate governance mechanisms. In this paper we investigate the overall effect of both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms on capital structure from a two-dimensional perspective. Specifically, we examine how the interaction between a powerful board and antitakeover provisions affects a firm"s debt financing policy.
On one hand, firms with a high G-index (a large number of antitakeover provisions) can issue debt at low cost. Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) and Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005) investigate the impact of antitakeover provisions on the bond yield spread, and find that firms with a large number of antitakeover provisions have low cost of debt financing. Because of the low cost of debt financing, shareholders would expect that managers issue more debt to maximize the firm value ex ante, which also maximizes the shareholders" value.
On the other hand, antitakeover provisions insulate managers from the labor market wherein alternative teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources (Jensen and Ruback 1983) . Antitakeover provisions shift control power to managers and are initiated at the expense of shareholders when the incumbent management wants to engage in opportunistic behavior and job protection (Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005) . Jensen and Meckling (1976) document that managers have incentives to engage in self-serving behavior such as extra consumption, empire building and shirking of effort. Alternatively, Amihud and Lev (1981) show that managers intend to engage in job protection to reduce their human capital risk since they hold undiversified portfolios. Therefore, antitakeover provisions shift control power to managers who have influence on a firm"s financing policy. Self-interest managers do not intend to issue more debt to discipline them unless other corporate governance mechanisms redirect them to do so.
Entrenched managers prefer equity to debt because a high level of debt increases the threat of bankruptcy that puts managers under pressure due to potential loss of control of their firms (Grossman and Hart 1982), because debt can reduce discretionary funds available to managers (Jensen 1986) , and because debt can subject managers to the scrutiny of the financial markets. Consistent with this hypothesis, Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) study associations between managerial entrenchment and firms" capital structures. Their results suggest that entrenched managers seek to avoid debt. Garvey and Hanka (1999) find that firms that are protected by second generation state antitakeover laws substantially reduce their use of debt, and unprotected firms do the reverse. If entrenched managers do not want to issue more debt to take advantage of the low cost of debt, shareholders will rely on internal corporate governance mechanisms of board power to redirect managers to make the optimal financing decision.
Consistent with this argument, Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997) , and Bange and Mazzeo (2004) find that boards dominated by independent directors are more likely to make decisions that are consistent to the interest of shareholders. Harford, Li and Zhao (2009) argue that board power (as measured by board independence) is the most important characteristic for a board to have in order to be effective in implementing an optimal capital structure. Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2007) find that the board power and anti-takeover provisions appear to be substitutes to serve as the corporate governance mechanisms and firms with powerful boards also have a large number of antitakeover provisions. In summary, we believe that the interaction between antitakeover provisions and board power positively affects the capital structure of firms. Then we have our Hypothesis: Strong boards are likely to exist when managers are entrenched by antitakeover provisions and strong boards redirect managers to choose debt over equity. Therefore, the interaction between antitakeover provisions and board independence has a positive impact on firm leverage Intuition tells us that the a powerful board will redirect managers to issue more debt to maximize the shareholders" interest when the number of antitakeover provisions is larger. Firms with a higher G-index can issue bonds with lower yields. According to the tradeoff theory of capital structure, firms will issue more debt to fully take advantage of the tax shield of the bond interest payments. The more powerful the board, the more debt the board will redirect managers to issue.
Data and Methodology
We use several databases in our analysis: RiskMetrics Corporate Governance database, the Compustat Industrial database for firm characteristics, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database (for price and return information), the Thomson Financial institutional and insider ownership database, the SDC database (for the debt filing information), and the Execucomp database of CEO compensation.
The RiskMetrics database provides annual data of the G-index for 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006 . For the years between the available G-index data, we follow John and Litov (2009) and assume that the index score is the same as the previous year. The G-index is developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) to characterize strength of shareholder rights across firms. The G-index is based on the count of 24 anti-takeover provisions across five board antitakeover provision rules. These rules include delaying a hostile takeover bid, protection to officers and directors, shareholder voting rights, state laws, and other antitakeover rules. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) set up the G-index by simply adding up all of provisions in the corporate charter. The G-index with the highest value has the largest number of antitakeover provisions, and the G-index with the lowest value has the smallest number of provisions. The RiskMetrics database also contains the data of board director characteristics, such as board independence and board size. These data are from publicly available proxy statements issued in anticipation of the annual meeting for the S&P 1500 companies.
In line with the tests in Berger et al (1997) , we also include other governance variables, such as managerial stock ownership, blockholders, and the Delta of CEO compensation. Data related to these variables are from the Execucomp database and the Thomson Financial institutional and insider ownership database. CEOs with higher ownership under certain limits may have stronger incentives to make value maximizing decisions than otherwise. However, these incentives may reverse if high managerial ownership insulates managers from disciplinary mechanisms (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988) . We also include CEO"s tenure, the Delta of CEO compensation, CEO excess compensation, and the presence of at least one 5% institutional shareholder. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) document that managers with longer tenure should have more bargaining power. Thus, CEO tenure has a positive effect on firm governance mechanisms, and often is associated with increased managerial control over internal monitoring mechanisms. The Delta of CEO"s compensation measures the sensitivity of managerial compensation to performance. It implies the effectiveness of the incentive of managers to work for shareholders" interest. Blockholders have direct incentive to monitor managers actively and strengthen corporate governance (e.g. Grossman and Hart 1982; Shleifer and Vishny 1986) . However, blockholders sometimes do not monitor managers because of risk aversion. There exists agency cost of blockholders' monitoring -blockholders can collude with managers to damage the interest of small shareholders (Barclay and Holderness 1991) . We use the existence of blockholders with more than 5% ownership as the proxy for blockholder holdings, consistent to Berger et al. (1997) . In computing these proxies except for the delta of managerial compensation, we follow Berger et al. (1997) . Table 1 offers brief descriptions of these variables.
In this paper, we study a large unbalanced panel of firms that are covered by the RiskMetrics data and also have data available from the CRSP/Compustat merged industrial annual database for [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . After getting the original data from WRDS, we impose the following filters: Financing firms (SIC codes 6000-6999), regulated utility firms (SIC codes 4800-4999), and firm-years when the firm is involved in major mergers and acquisitions (Compustat footnote codes AB) are excluded. We also excluded firm-year observations that report cash flow data using format codes 4, 5, and 6 (4 and 6 are undefined by Compustat; 5 is the Canadian file) or those in which the code is missing. We further remove missing observations and outliers. After imposing these filters, we obtain a sample that consists of 7585 firm-year observations with available G-index and independent board data.
Summary statistics for the final sample are shown in the Table1. We also separate the sample by quintiles of the G-index and independent boards, and the results are shown in Table 2 . We note an interesting pattern that there is a monotonic increase across the quintiles of board independence and the G-index. Our main empirical model goes as follows:
Where i, j and t indicate firm, industry, and year. is a measure of book leverage and market leverage. We include the year effect and industry effect. The set of firm characteristics we use as control variables include profitability (EBITDA), asset tangibility (net property, plant and equipment), firm size (total assets), and market-to-book ratio. We have the credit rating dummy to control firm"s access to the public debt market. All of the control variables about firm characteristics are the same as John and Litov (2009) . Also, we include other corporate governance proxies, e.g. board size, managerial ownership, and delta of CEO compensation as control variables (the same as John and Litov (2009) , except the option holding which we replace with the delta of CEO compensation). We further cluster adjust the regression standard error at the firm level, in order to account for the possible autocorrelation in the residuals in case of the lack of within-firm variation in the firm characteristics and corporate governance characteristics.
Empirical Results
To assess how board power and takeover provisions influence debt financing decisions, we examine the association between firm leverage and governance mechanisms, the level of board independence and the number of governance provisions (G-index). Book leverage 1 is defined as the ratio of book debt to total assets. Book debt is defined as total assets (#6) -book equity, as of the end of the current fiscal year. Book equity is defined as total assets (#6) -total liabilities (#181)-preferred stock (#10) + deferred taxes (#35) + convertible debt (#79) as of the end of the current fiscal year. Market leverage 1 is defined as book debt divided by market value of assets (equal to total assets minus book equity plus market equity, while market equity is calculated as shares outstanding (#25) multiplied by price (#199)). We further report results using different definitions of book leverage, which refers to book debt ratio calculated as (long term debt + short term debt)/total assets. Market leverage 2 is defined as book debt divided by market value of assets (equal to total assets minus book equity plus market equity). (#6) as of the end of the fiscal year. PPE is the net property, plant and equipment (#8) divided by total assets as of the current fiscal year. Market-to-book is calculated according to the DGTW (1997) method. EBITDA is EBITDA (#13) divided by total assets (#6) as of the current fiscal year. Corporate governance characteristics: G-index is the index introduced by Gomperet.al (2003) to count the presence of 24 antitakeover provisions. CEO stock ownership is the ratio of shares held by the CEO / shares outstanding. Board independence is defined as number of outside directors on the board / board size. Board size is defined as ln(board size). Blockholder dummy is the dummy variable equal to 1 if there is at least one institutional shareholder with at least 5% stake in the company. Excess compensation is the residual in the OLS regression: log(Salaryi,t + Bonusi,t) = b1log(Salesi,t) + b2(CEO stocki,t + option ownershipi,t (%)) + b3Agei,t + b4Years as CEOi,t + b5ROA i,t + b6ROAi,t-1 + b7(Excess stock returni,t)+ b8(Excess stock returni,t-1) + g*(Industry dummies) + h*(Year dummies). All of these definitions follow Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) . Delta of CEO compensation is computed following Guay (1999, 2002 Table 1 shows summary statistics and Table 2 shows univariate results of how leverage changes with the changes of board independence and the G-index. For Table 2 , we first partition the sample into low board independence and high board independence subsamples, and then in each subsample we further partition it into five groups according to the G-index. We plot the average debt ratio for each group and we use four different measures of leverage. The univariate result shows that leverage is not always increasing in the G-index. The positive relationship between leverage and the G-index consistently exists in high board independence groups but not in low board independence groups. This result supports our hypothesis that a strong board redirects entrenched managers to use more debt. In the first regression, we follow the same empirical model as John and Litov (2009) , using the G-index as the explanatory variable, and firm characteristics, such as firm size, profitability, market to book ratio, tangible assets, and credit rating dummy, as the control variables. We get similar results that the G-index has positive effect on firm leverage as John and Litov (2009) . Firms with higher G-index issue more debt than do firms with lower G-index. We also find that market to book ratio has positive effect on book leverage, but negative effect on market leverage. This is consistent with the findings of Hackbarth and Mauer (2009) . Also, a 1 point increase of profit causes a -0.564 point decrease in book leverage 1, and a -0.749 point decrease in market leverage 1. This result supports the pecking order theory in the capital structure. In addition, we find a positive relationship between the credit rating dummy and leverage, which implies that access to the public debt market has a positive impact on firm leverage. This finding is consistent with that of Faulkender and Peterson (2006) . Because the measure of leverage sometimes has effects on the statistical significance of estimated coefficients of interest, we also take another measure of the amount of debt the firm holds and take the debt amount as the sum of total short-term debt and long-term debt. The results are in line with results above. All of the results in detail are shown in the first four columns of Table 3 .
Table 3: Leverage and interaction of G-index and board power
This table gives the estimated coefficients of the book value and market value of firm leverage explained by the G-index, board independence, the interaction term of both, and control variables of firm characteristics. We exclude all firms in the regulated (SIC headers 48 and 49) and financial (headers 60 through 69) industries. All of the regressions take into account year fixed effects and industry fixed effects (two-digit SIC code), of which the result we do not report. The t-statistics is based on robust standard errors, cluster-adjusted at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate the significance of estimated coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, correspondingly.
The finding of a positive relationship between the G-index and leverage support Jiraporn and Gleason (2009), Wald and Long (2007) , and John and Litov (2009) .Furthermore, to fully understand the story behind this finding, we include the board power (proxied by board independence, following Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2007) ) and its interaction with G-indexes as the control variables. Also we include the fraction of the firm"s stock owned by directors as the control variable given that previous research has found that charter provisions and board structure are related to managerial ownership (e.g., Danielson and Karpoff 1998; Denis and Sarin 1999) . The added control variable of managerial ownership is consistent with the methodology of Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2007) and Harford, Li, and Zhao (2009) . Surprisingly, after adding the control variables, we find that the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient of the G-index disappears and the coefficient of interaction of board independence and G-index is always significant. This result supports the hypothesis that the interaction between antitakeover provisions and board power has a positive correlation with debt financing. The powerful board will redirect managers to issue more debt to maximize the shareholders" interest when the number of antitakeover provisions is larger because the cost of debt is lower in the firm with a higher G-index (Cremers, Nair, and Wei 2007; Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell 2005) . Also, the more powerful the board, the more debt the board will redirect managers to issue. We further check the robustness of our finding to alternative measures of leverage that only short-term debt and long-term debt are involved in the book value of debt. Our results are still obtained. For example, the coefficients of interaction between board power and the G-index is 0.1 for book leverage and 0.084 for market leverage with the t statistics of 2.27 and 2.16. All of the findings in detail are provided in columns 5-8 of Table 3 . Table 4 shows the empirical results after controlling for corporate governance variables studied in Berger et. al (1997) except that the option holding is replaced by the delta of CEO compensation. The reason for this replacement is because some researchers find that the delta of CEO compensation measures the sensitivity of CEO payment to performance (for example Colesa, Danielb, and Naveen (2006)). Other corporate governance proxies include blockholders, board size, and the tenure of CEO etc. Including these additional corporate governance proxies do not change the significance and sign of the coefficient on the interaction term of board independence and the G-index. The estimated coefficients of other corporate governance are similar to those in Berger et. al (1997) except for managerial stock ownership. We find that the coefficient of managerial ownership is negative. This finding is in line with the finding of John and Lotiv (2009) .
In addition, we revisit the empirical model in the framework that allow for the endogeneity problem in the firm financing policy. It is possible that firms jointly determine firm leverage with the corporate governance mechanisms. Firms may simultaneously make the decisions to issue more debt, increase the board independence (board power), increase the fraction of CEO stock ownership, and adopt more charter provisions to prevent outside hostile takeovers. Moreover, the access to the public debt market (proxied by the availability of credit rating) and the levels of leverage have an effect on each other. The access to the public debt market can increase firm leverage because of the low cost of public debt. On the other hand, a firm with high leverage may have a low credit rating because of the high probability of default. Due to the endogeneity problem, OLS coefficients could be biased. To address the ensuing endogeneity in Table 4 , we treat the G-index, board power, managerial ownership and credit rating dummy as endogenous in the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation framework. The 2SLS method relies on instrumental variables for the endogenous variables in the first-stage regressions. To find valid instrumental variables, we follow two rules: Instrumental variables should have correlation with the endogenous variables but no correlation with the residual in the second-stage regression, of which the dependent variable is leverage. We follow John and Litov (2009) and use the annual average of the G-index, based on its value for other companies whose headquarters are located in the same state within the same year, for the instruments for the G-index. John and Litov (2009) argue that "Such a state-peer effect on governance could exist, if, for example, influential stakeholders in the state of location (e.g. representatives of state labor unions, current or former CEOs from other companies headquartered in the same state, local consultants and legal counsel, and other prominent state residents) are appointed to serve as directors on the board of the firm in question. To the extent that such directors may sit on the boards of other locallyheadquartered corporations (i.e., be part of a local director network), these stakeholders may influence the board of the company of interest to adopt similar anti-takeover protection devices as other firms headquartered in that state. We hence expect that the instrument would positively correlate with the G-index. At the same time we expect this instrument would be uncorrelated with the second-stage (leverage) regressions residuals. In addition, we use the other firms" average in the same industry (in the same two-digit SIC code industry) to instrument the managerial ownership and board independence, the same way as John and Litov (2009) . In terms of the instrument for the credit rating dummy, we follow Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and use the percentage of firms in the same 3-digit industry that have a credit rating, excluding the firm of interest, where we assume the weight as the market value of that firm"s assets on the appearance of credit rating.
The results of the first-stage regressions, explaining the endogenous variables, are reported in panel A of table 5. The regression includes the same control variables as in the secondstage which includes the fixed year effect and industry effect, which we do not report. Consistent with the John and Kadyrzhanova (2008), we find that firms are less likely to adopt antitakeover provisions if fewer of their peers at the same headquarter location adopt them. Also, we find that the average board independence and managerial ownership of other firms in the same industry (the first 2-digits of the SIC code) has explanatory power on board independence and managerial ownership. Two-stage least squares analysis of book leverage and market leverage on the G-index, board independence and the interaction of both, and control variables, where we treat the G-index, board independence and managerial ownership proxies and the credit rating dummy as endogenous. Panel A presents the estimates of the first stage regressions of the G-index, board independence and managerial ownership on the excluded instruments and control variables. We instrument the G-index with the annual average of this index for other companies headquartered in the same state. We instrument board independence and managerial ownership with the industry average excluding the firm of interest. And we instrument the credit rating dummy with the log of one plus the percentage of firms in the same three-digit SIC industry that have a bond rating weighted by the market value of assets, following Faulkender and Petersen (2006) . Regressions have the same control variables as in the second-stage equations (Panel B), including fixed year and industry effects, which we do not report. The partial R-squared is the fraction of the variation of the instrumented variable explained by the instruments, net of their effect through the exogenous variables. The absolute value of the t-statistics is based on standard errors, cluster-adjusted at the firm level. ***, **, and *indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, correspondingly. The 2SLS second-stage results for firm leverage regressions are reported in panel B in table 5. We first run regressions on the leverage defined in the same way as John and Litov (2009) , then on the leverage defined as the book debt/total asset of book value or market value. The book debt is the sum of short-term debt and long term debt. The instrumented G-index has negative but insignificant coefficients. The instrumented board independence also has a negative effect on the firm"s leverage. The most important finding is that the instrumented interaction term of G-index and board independence still has the positive effect on the firm"s debt financing decision. We conclude that the 2SLS results support the conclusion that the firm"s leverage depends on the interaction of board power and antitakeover provisions. This result suggests that leverage decisions are related to how the board power interacts with the antitakeover provisions, but not antitakeover provisions per se. Therefore, the two types of corporate governance mechanisms, and the interaction between the internal and external governance tools, are relevant to understand how corporate governance influences debt financing policy.
Conclusion
This paper examines how the firm"s debt financing policy is related to board power and antitakeover provisions. Using recent data, we find that the effect of agency conflicts on a firm"s leverage is related to the interaction of board power and antitakeover provisions. Specifically, we find that firms with more antitakeover provisions operate at higher debt levels if they are also exposed to greater board power. This result supports our hypothesis that powerful boards redirect managers to issue more debt to maximize shareholders" wealth when the number of antitakeover provisions is larger. Also, the more powerful the board, the more debt the board will redirect managers to issue. Our result continues to hold after controlling for other governance proxies, such as CEO"s stock ownership, CEO"s tenure, Delta of CEO"s compensation, and the appearance of blockholders. We also document that the correlation between the leverage and antitakeover provisions becomes insignificant when we control for the interaction between board power and antitakeover provisions. That implies provisions per se do not have an effect on firm"s debt financing decision, and what really matters is antitakeover provisions' interaction with board power.
In all, this paper reconciles the seemingly conflicting results documented in the extant literature about the impact of governance mechanisms on debt financing. We find that the interaction between board power and antitakeover provisions affects firms" leverage. The evidence implies that either internal or external governance mechanisms may not fully explain the variations of a firm"s leverage policy. When we consider the effect of agency conflicts on the firm"s capital structure, we need to consider both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms and include the interaction between board power and antitakeover provisions.
Our paper has several limitations. First, the causal effect of the interaction between internal and external governance mechanisms on leverage has not been established clearly. That is because we have not found a natural experiment to directly identify the impact of interaction between governance mechanisms. Future research could explore if a pseudo natural experiment could be identified. Second, the abnormal stock returns could be compared between the "strong" board and the "weak" board, if both companies' debt level and other financial data are similar. We leave this area to future research.
